7 main tactical ideas of 2017 – 1xSport
7 main tactical ideas of 2017

7 main tactical ideas of 2017

Personal custody is alive again. But barely breathing

Personal-oriented pressing has become a familiar history for modern football. Players disassemble their rivals, they are thrown at them even before the ball is accepted, and they also have an alien penalty. In this regard, perhaps the most interesting team-"Atalanta" Gian Piero Gasperini: Its players are ready to cover the attacking opponent, even behind the central circle, and no matter who is opposite. Juventus, Dibale and Iguainu also battered. But this year situational recalled the personal guardianship of the old model, and most of these situations ended badly for the coach, invented the staff.

The three most instructive cases of the staff for the calendar year happened to Leo Messi. In the super of Spain the coach of "real" Zinedine Zidane taped to Messi by the guard Mateo Kovacic, and then the fresh (well forgotten old) decision played. Kovacic ran for Messi from the central circle to the penalty, survived for an hour and only once lost the Argentine position. To Clasico in the championship Messi already learned to react to the staff correctly, and helped him with the case of "Girona" and the right defender of Maffeo, specifically taped Messi on his shoulders.

Messi talked teeth Maffeo, annoyed with his work, but after a meeting with Ernesto Valverde, coach of FC Barcelona, changed the manner of the game-he consciously became less touching the ball, but created zones for partners. By the way, Maffeo also confirmed the axiom Kovacic-personally against Messi can withstand no more than an hour. In December "Clasico" Croat from "real" again played by Leo personally, but Messi dismissed him and organized for the card free zone-so was born a goal. Here is an important lesson for those who will try the staff in 2018: if fritter your player on a foreign leader, the positional build of the team will suffer.

Gegenpressing died. Now exactly

Dutch stubborn Peter Bosch came to put the patient on his feet with the same medications that were cured by Ajax, but instead recorded a medical fact. Kontrpressing, or gegenpressing, as it is called in Germany with the submission of Jürgen Poll, no longer works in Bundesliga. And in general in any championship with different styles of game and tactical flexibility. Bosch built "Borussia" on a rigid scheme 4-3-3, with a powerful pressure immediately after the loss, the extreme defenders of the alien corner flag and full participation in the intimidations of the entire team. The antidote found Tottenham Pochettino, and then picked up the entire Bundesliga: it was enough to provoke and throw long transmissions, creating situations where two central defenders remain at the best in numerical equality.

Bosch immodestly compared himself with Josep Guardiola: "It was not easy for me to assess whether my methods would work in Bundesliga. I think Pep Guardiola faced the same problem in early Bavaria. Only Guardiola indefinitely adapts ideas to the environment, and Bosch stubbornly follows one tactical philosophy. The Dutchman blind a steep attack, but the actions in the defense were forced only to weep. "Borussia" did not invent a bicycle – she simply repeated her diagnosis from 2014: kontrpressing Jürgen poll was already terribly vulnerable.

The main adept 4-3-3 declined from 4-3-3

Important story in the context of the tactical development of football. For Barcelona, the 4-3-3 is not just the numbers that indicate the arrangement, it is the genetic code. Cruyff, Wang Gal and Guardiola made 4-3-3 the main scheme of "bars", it is used at all youth levels of preparation, and if someone refused to arrange, as pep-passed to 3-4-3.

Now everything has changed, and the new head coach is the fault. Ernesto Valverde is one of the many fans of the 4-4-2 scheme in Spanish football, and he faced a difficult task: to preserve the compactness of the arrangement inherent in his "athletics", and the triangles, which became the chip "bars". Valverde changed a lot-for example, docked the functionality of Sergio thrilling and at the same time made it stronger-but all the tasks performed. Central midfielders move the ball better, and Leo Messi is looking for free space in the center and "Zone 14". This creates the triangles you are looking for. Compact, with the exception of the right flank, is also preserved-only Rakitic and Paulinho too much fall to the center. For the righteous tiki-like Xavi, the new Barcelona ignites vital organs. For Valverde it does not play any difference-it was important to shake Catalans.

Thus in 4-4-2 many elements of good old 4-3-3 are saved. The extreme defenders are still included in the Poluflang, so the role of Jordi Alba has not changed at all. Three midfielders also chase the ball forward and Soyuz if necessary. Messi also works in "zone 14" and decides the fate of the match, even stepping 83% of the game time on foot, as it was in "Clasico". Except that in the attack the second striker included the overall Paulinho with a chic feeling, when it is necessary to make a jerk in the penalty-this in 4-3-3 was not exactly.

It is amusing to watch FC Barcelona quietly give the ball to Real Madrid in Clasico and depart from 4-3-3, and in Italy, where Calcio and Catenaccio are considered synonyms from prehistoric times, 4-3-3 becomes the main tactical scheme of the league. On 4-3-3 played "Roma" and "Napoli", the most played teams of Serie A, "Inter" Situationally uses a similar scheme, and Max Allegri for the use of 4-3-3-his favorite scheme-even sent to the reserve of Paulo Dibalu. Football is cyclical, just sometimes a new cycle arises quite suddenly.

The world is obsessed with the big attackers on the flank

Massimiliano Allegri makes an image of Antitactic, little zamorachivajas about schemes and game tasks in conversations with journalists. But he pribednjaetsja. Allegri is always looking for new options for the development of command tactics, and another came to him in the spring of 2016-the pure striker Mario Mandzukic became the left winger. "Juventus" loves to saturate someone else's penalty for awnings, so the plan was clear-the ball was brought to the right edge, Cuadrado or Douglas Costa Naveshival on the far bar, and Mandzukic, combining speed and jump, took the ball into the gate with the defender.

7 main tactical ideas of 2017

The idea is not new-in a similar way attacked "Inter"-2010 with Eto'o and Balotelli-but the feverish spread she received only now. Tottenham used this player to ally-not a pure forward, but also a powerful player, useful at the top. Massimo Carrera in Spartak tried to saturate the penalty with the help of Luiz Adriano, placing it on the same position as Allegri Mandzhukicha. Gennaro Gattuso in "Milan" once tried an idea with the left Insajdom Patrick Kutrone, only thought quickly recognized the deadlock.

There are more insane ideas. Hain Vanhazebruk, having received a coaching work in "Anderlehte", has rebuilt the command on scheme 3-4-3, and on a position of the left lateral began to put forwards-Onekuru and Isuzu. Behind them cover the necessary volume and give to the left central defender, a demine, to shoot the top in the penalty, and at attacks-together with Teodorchikom fill someone else's penalty, as the second strikers. Perhaps this is the craziest tactical idea of the calendar year. At the Belgian championship level it works.

Abrupt change of tactical philosophy – mass disease in Europe

Successes of geeks or laptop-trainers, as they are called in the Netherlands (the second term like even more), have provoked the increased trust to such coaches. Summary of the steep tactic, which calls a dietitian, prohibits all possible food and pushes the right speech in the locker room, becomes a pass to any club of the middle hand, wanting to become steeper. And the experience of the previous coach, his game style, the players recruited under him, are already secondary.

Summer gave three examples at once when the coach came to a completely inconsistent with his style team. "Saint-Etienne" took instead of the head of the bus park Christoph Galte adept Catalan football Oscar Garcia-he put instead 5-4-1 scheme 4-3-3 and planted control of the ball, but surrendered after 0:5 in the Ronskom Derby. He needed suitable players under the style, and the management of "se" drove him only Hernani.

Instead of Claude Pjujelja, Fanatejushhego from the control of the ball, "Southampton" took Mauricio Pellegrino-such Argentine clone Kurban Berdyeva. The story is that Puel continued the trends of Pochettino and Cumana, gradually deducing "hundredth" on a new step of tactical development. Pellegrino rolled the development of the team somewhere before Nigel Atkins – by the way, no wonder if you forgot when Atkins worked with Southampton. Slowed all leaders, especially attack players. Dusan Tadic now and a year ago-the players are different.

and "Alaves", from where Pellegrino left, signed coach Luis Subeldiju, abruptly switched to his insane attacking ideas (like constant attacks on the arrangement of 2-3-5)… and decided to coach the resignation after four matches.

Now Lille comes on a fresh rake. Mad Marcelo Belsu changed Galte-the same manager of the bus park. You already know whose ideas in the spring are exactly fail.

Playmaker becomes the central defender… and plays playmaker

Ajax is disappointed in Marseille Kaiser, a typical coach from the club structure (behind the back – experience of working with youth and zero or minimal experience in jeredivizii), in just six months. A strange story for the ideological club, when the coach was convicted for a zero result-and "Ajax" almost lost the chance for gold and for the first time in half a century flew past the main grid cups. At the same time, the numbers of "Ajax" Kaiser became stronger than "Ajax" Peter Bosch, and along the way Kaiser invented one cool tactical solution. The coach has taken the basis of Frankie de Jong, smart "six" or "eight" of the youth team, began to drag him on adjacent positions, and in December sent de Jong to the center of Defense.

"Frankie is the player who creates the 4-3-3-3-3-3 scheme for Ajax," Kaiser said. Maybe the coach is a little crossed with the number of triples, but the point is clear. De Jong's strengths – smart pass and mischievous adventurous dribbling – were used in different zones to add another player to the standard Ajax triangles. With the transfer in defense de Jong continued to adventurous move the ball forward to dribbling, and the configuration of the build-APA "Ajax" was rebuilt under the young player. De Jong received the ball above another central defender, forming the arrangement 1-3…

7 main tactical ideas of 2017

… And then he built a triangle with someone from the central midfielder (Sean, Van de Beck, Zieh), or moved the ball himself, finding the empty zones in the lines of rivals.

7 main tactical ideas of 2017

De Jong is sure that the risk is correct: "I do not feel that if I get the ball from behind-should immediately knock it out or make a safe transfer. They say that my actions are risky, but the main thing is to make them at the right time. " Defender-Dribljor, whose timing is in full order, broke the line psv in "De Toppere" (Ajax won it 3:0), and then gave a number of strong matches in his role. It is a pity that de Jong in such a role we are not likely to see – but such an idea can penetrate the championships stronger. Jeredivizija is a supplier of not only players but also complex tactical solutions of simple situations. The story of De Jong will definitely appeal to the coaches-geeky like Juliana Nagelsmanna, and moreover, can influence the development of football as a whole with proper use.

Knock the ball out of the center of the field? This is the norm

The strangest tactical idea of the year was presented by "Marcel" and Rudy Garcia. Since September, when "Om" played in Amiens, the team invariably starts time with its starting possession equally-beating the ball into the out, voluntarily abandoning the ball. It is not a technical marriage, namely the installation of the shoot for the side line.

7 main tactical ideas of 2017

Rudy Garcia does not talk about his tactical finding a little more, so I judge only by the actions of the players of "Marseille". Beating the ball into the out, Provencal immediately accelerated to the zone, where the throw will be made to impose flank pressure. All players are dismantled, another-Florian Toven-worsens the visibility of thrower. Probably, pressure in such situations is calculated on creation of free zones after interception, moments when opponents ' defenders lose position and open space. In Garcia's opinion, such situations are guaranteed to be more acute than the attack after the standard ball draw.

At the same time, the idea of "Marseille" does not extract anything at all. Only once "Om" after the start pressure at batter squeezed a hit on the goal-and from a long distance, not from the penalty. In other cases "Marcel" gets the ball even behind the Central line (if it gets). Oddly, it's not like the idea of Antifootball, it's strange that Rudy Garcia still follows her, although she's not working.


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